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以下のテキストは、Korean Buddhism in East Asian Perspective. (Korean Studies Series No. 35.) Jimoondang, 2007. pp. 321-331. に掲載された論文の提出原稿をHTML化したものです。 実際に掲載されたものと異なる場合があると思いますが、ご了承ください。

Xuanzang's Inference of Yogācāra and Its Interpretation by Shilla Buddhists.

Shigeki Moro^*

1. Introduction

Xuanzang's 玄奘 (602–664) biographies^☆1 indicate that he wrote several texts in India such as Huizong-lun 會宗論 (Treatise for Reconciling Various Doctrines),^☆2 Zhiejian-lun 制惡見論 (Treatise for Controlling the Wrong View),^☆3 and Sanshen-lun 三身論 (Treatise on the Three Bodies of the Buddha).^☆4 Since none of these texts have been preserved, we cannot read them; however, a part of their contents could be gathered from several sources. According to Yinmin-ruzhengli-lun-shu 因明入正理論疏 (Commentary on Nyāya-praveśa), authored by Ji 基 (632–682), Xuanzang made an inference (anumāna)^☆5to prove the truth of Yogācāra:

After traveling around India and completing his study, our master, Xuanzang, wanted to return to China. At that time, Śīlāditta, who was the king of India, held a large and uninterrupted Buddhist service that lasted for eighteen days and asked our master to spread his interpretation of Yogācāra all over India. The king chose those who have wisdom and goodness, called them to the service. He sent non-Buddhists and Hīnayāna Buddhists to dispute with Xuanzang. Our master had made the following inference and no one could make an argument against it:

• In the ultimate reality, generally accepted forms are not apart from visual consciousness [proposition].
• This is because based on the theory which we (Yogācārin) accept they are categorized in the first three of eighteen elements of human existence (the eye, from the six organs; sight, from the six objects; and visual consciousness, from the six consciousnesses); however, they are not included in the general eyes (which include the eye of Buddha etc.) [reason].
• Like as the visual consciousness [simile].^☆6

According to Xuanzang's biography in Xugaosengzhuan 續高僧傳 (the Further Biographies of Eminent Monks), the concepts contained in Zhiejian-lun were preached during the service held by Śīlāditta. Therefore, Xuanzang's inference may be regarded as a part of Zhiejian-lun.^☆7

Based on Xuanzang's biographies, no one present at the Buddhist service could make an argument against his inference. However, numerous problems regarding the inference arose immediately after the service, and there were prolonged discussions on how it would be interpreted in East Asia. In general, two issues are relevant for the criticism or the interpretation of the inference.

The first issue is the similarity between the style of Xuanzang's inference and Bhāvaviveka's (c. 490–570) logical method. One of the features of Bhāvaviveka's logic is the restriction “in the ultimate reality” in order to make an argument for śūnyatā. In Xuanzang's inference quoted above, the same restriction is used to prove the truth of Yogācāra. Yasunori Ejima claims that Xuanzang's inference was based on Bhāvaviveka's method.^☆8 On the other hand, Bhāvaviveka has been criticized by the Faxiang school (the East Asian branch of Yogācāra) since he was regarded as a master of the Mādhyamika school.

The second issue is whether or not fallacies exist in Xuanzang's inference. Hajime Nakamura claims that the Yogācāra inference has errors; he has a high opinion of the Shilla monks, such as Sunkyŏng 順憬 and Wŏnhyo 元曉, because they did not blindly follow authority but criticized it.^☆9 Nakamura also regards the Shilla Buddhists' interpretations of Xuanzang's inference as characteristic of the Korean way of thinking. By citing the development of Han'gŭl as an example, he states that the Shilla Buddhists' interpretations of Xuanzang's inference demonstrate the rationalism of the Korean people.

In this study, I have collected and examined the Shilla Buddhists' interpretations of Xuanzang's Yogācāra inference in order to clarify the intellectual situation of Yogācāra Buddhism in Shilla, and criticize Nakamura's understanding, and thus, this paper contributes to the studies on the characteristics of Korean Buddhism.

2. Bhāvaviveka's reputation in Shilla

Before we examine the interpretations of Xuanzang's inference in Shilla, it is important to understand the transition that Bhāvaviveka's reputation underwent in Shilla.^☆10 Bhāvaviveka's reputation was divided in East Asia; while some people believed him to be good others had a less charitable opinion of him. Based on Xuanzang's inference and his descriptions of Bhāvaviveka, it appears reasonable to suppose that Xuanzang thought highly of Bhāvaviveka. According to a narrative on Bhāvaviveka in Datang-xiyu-ji 大唐西域記, Xuanzang praises Bhāvaviveka and refers to him as “broad-minded and virtuous.”^☆11 In addition, he describes Bhāvaviveka's faith in Maitreya in a positive manner. Hence, we may assume that some of Xuanzang's followers also thought highly of Bhāvaviveka.

On the other hand, Bhāvaviveka's inference in Dasheng-zhangzhen-lun 大乘掌珍論 had been criticized in East Asia. The opening verse of Dasheng-zhangzhen-lun is as follows:

In the ultimate reality, a conditioned existence is empty, like an illusion, since it is produced by causal conditions.
An unconditioned existence also does not have any entities since like illusory flowers in the sky, it can never be generated.^☆12

Shun'ei Hirai states that the scholar monks of the Faxiang school might have studied Dasheng-zhangzhen-lun because it was translated by Xuanzang.^☆13 Based on Shōshin Fukihara's list of the commentaries of Dasheng-zhangzhen-lun, we can find the names of Wenbei 文備, Jingmai 靖邁, Shentai 神泰, Wŏnhyo, and T'aehyŏn 太賢 as the authors of these commentaries; however, the original commentaries of these authors have been lost.^☆14 It may be difficult to accept Hirai, since Wenbei was regarded as a “schoolmate of Xuanzang,”^☆15 Wŏnhyo had never met Xuanzang, and T'aehyŏn was much younger than Xuanzang.

In this connection, we would like to focus on Zenju's 善珠 (724–797) Yuishiki-bunryō-ketsu 唯識分量決, which discusses the differences in the inferences in Dasheng-zhangzhen-lun and Dasheng-guangbailun-shilun 大乘廣百論釋論 (Dharmapāla's commentary on Āryadeva's Guangbailun 廣百論) that quotes Korean scholar monks.

Master Wŏnhyo of Shilla, in his P'an-biryang-non 判比量論, states that the inference in Dasheng-zhangzhen-lun is identical to that in Dasheng-guangbailun-shilun.
Master Tojŭng 道證 claims that Wŏnhyo's interpretation is incorrect since the two inferences have different targets. (…) Although both the inferences were drawn in order to confute the nature of existence that was a result of attachment, the targets are different. Dasheng-guangbailun-shilun criticizes only the Hīnayāna and non-Buddhist schools. Dasheng-zhangzhen-lun, however, criticizes the Mahāyāna, Hīnayāna, and non-Buddhist schools.
Master Sinbang 神昉 states that the targets of Dasheng-zhangzhen-lun and Dasheng-guangbailun-shilun are not different (…) because both the texts serve the same purpose. (…)
Master Kyŏnghŭng 憬興 states that the inferences in these two texts are different. (…) The concepts in Dasheng-zhangzhen-lun are based on emptiness, while those of Dasheng-guangbailun-shilun are based on the absence of reality. Hence, the purposes of both these texts are quite different. (…) For details of this, see the 10th volume of Sŏng-yusingnon-p'yŏmyang 成唯識論貶量.^☆16

To cite another example on this topic, T'aehyŏn's Sŏng-yusingnon-hakki 成唯識論學記 discusses whether the controversy between Dharmapāla and Bhāvaviveka was a historical fact or not. In the initial part of Sŏng-yusingnon-hakki, T'aehyŏn reveals the existence of three groups in Shilla:

There were two groups in India: Bhāvaviveka and his followers, who referred to the Prajñāpāramitā sūtras, claimed that conditioned and unconditioned existences are perceived by the ordinary view but appear empty in the true view, which is similar to the verses of Dasheng-zhangzhen-lun. (…) On the other hand, Dharmapāla and his followers, who referred to the Samdhinirmocana, claimed that all existences are perceived both as empty and not empty, which is similar to the verses of Madhyāntavibhāga. (…)
(a) Some people claim that the controversy between the two masters is a historical fact since the Buddhabhūmisūtra-śāstra states that “one thousand years after the death of Śākyamuni, a controversy will arise among the Mahāyāna between the school that professes emptiness and the one that professes existence.” (…) Wŏnch'ŭk 圓測 and his followers also claimed that the controversy existed between the two schools.
(b) However, others state that the two masters did not dispute. (…) Sun'gyŏng and his followers state that no controversy existed.
(c) Other monks such as Wŏnhyo and his followers claim that although the two masters expressed their opinions differently, the fundamental meaning of their teachings is the same. (…)^☆17

Hence, based on these two quotations, it is reasonable to suppose that Shilla had at least two groups with different opinions on the evaluations of Bhāvaviveka's inference in Shilla.^☆18 In general, Wŏnhyo, Sinbang, and Sun'gyŏng were of the belief that Bhāvaviveka and Dharmapāla had a dispute. On the other hand, Tojŭng, Kyŏnghŭng, and Wŏnch'ŭk believed that they were compatible. Dharmapāla was one of the founders of the Faxiang school and was the master of Śīlabhadra who was a master of Xuanzang. Therefore, it may be presumed that the evaluations of Bhāvaviveka's inference were related with those of Xuanzang's inference.

3. Commentaries on Xuanzang's Inference in Shilla

Thus far I have outlined the interpretations of Bhāvaviveka's inference. Next, I would like to examine the Shilla Buddhists' interpretations of Xuanzang's Yogācāra inference. In this chapter, I also classify the Shilla scholar monks into two groups according to their claims on Xuanzang's inference and the arguments on Bhāvaviveka's inference discussed above.

The first group consists of Wŏnhyo and Sun'gyŏng. Zenju's Inmyō-ronsho-myōtō-shō 因明論疏明燈抄 quotes Wŏnhyo's P'anbiryangnon, which points out the flaws in Xuanzang's inference^☆19:

When discussing with the schools that accept the mutual use of five organs, the inference should be as follows:

• In the ultimate reality, the generally accepted forms differ from the generally accepted visual consciousness.
• This is because based on the theory that we accept they are categorized in the first three; however, they are not included in the visual consciousness.
• Like as the eye.

Hence, the inference is free of the anaikāntiko viruddhāvyabhicāra (being counterbalanced; 相違決定) flaws.^☆20

For example, in the context of the Yogācāra theory, a bodhisattva who is higher than the eighth bhūmi can see with the ears, hear with the eyes, and so forth. In such a context, we can make the following inference, which is contrary to Xuanzang's Yogācāra inference:

• In the ultimate reality, the generally accepted forms differ from the visual consciousness.

Therefore, Wŏnhyo indicates the anaikāntiko viruddhāvyabhicāra flaw in Xuanzang's inference and makes a more accurate inference.

On the other hand, according to Ji 基, Sun'gyŏng pointed out that Xuanzang's inference also contained the anaikāntiko viruddhāvyabhicāra flaw and made the following inference to counter the flaw in Xuanzang's inference:

• In the ultimate reality, the generally accepted forms definitely differ from the visual consciousness.
• This is because based on the theory which we accept they are categorized in the first three; however, they are not included in the visual consciousness.
• Like as the eye.^☆21

However, according to Japanese sources, such as Zenju's Inmyō-ronsho-myōtō-shō, this counter inference appears to be originally based on Wŏnhyo's inference:

This counter inference that demonstrates Xuanzang's anaikāntiko viruddhāvyabhicāra flaw was originally made by Master Wŏnhyo of Shilla. After some time, Master Sun'gyŏng learned this counter inference, but could not interpret it. During the Ganfeng 乾封 era, he sent this inference to the Great Tang and requested them to interpret it. Master Dingping 定賓 states the following in his commentary on Nyāyamukha: “During the Ganfeng era, master Sun'gyŏng of Shilla sent the counter inference in order to demonstrate Xuanzang's anaikāntiko viruddhāvyabhicāra flaw that was pointed out by Master Wŏnhyo of his country (Korea) to this country (China), and claimed that ‘In the ultimate reality, the generally accepted forms are definitely different from visual consciousness. The reason and simile follow this (proposition).' At that time, Xuanzang, faltered and could not provide an answer.”^☆22

In addition, Zōshun 藏俊 (1104–1180) in his Inmyō-daisho-shō 因明大疏抄 quoted a story from Gangyō-wajō-engi 元曉和上緣起, which also regards Wŏnhyo as the original author of the counter inference and a reincarnation of Dignāga, and Sun'gyŏng as the messenger.^☆23 In contrast, Shōtōin's work Yuishiki-hiryō-shiki 小塔院唯識比量私記, quoted in Inmyō-daisho-shō regards Sun'gyŏng as the author and Master Yu 裕 as the messenger (T68, 525b); this interpretation is based on Ji's work Cheng-weishi-lun-zhangzhong-shuyao 成唯識論掌中樞要 (T43, 647a).

In any case, it is reasonable to believe that there was a lineage of Buddhist logicians in Shilla who originated from Wŏnhyo.

In Inmyō-daisho-shō, there exists a quotation titled Gojŏkki 古迹記, which is supposed to be a fragment of T'aehyŏn's commentary:

(a) 極成色者, 基云「爲簡唯小乘許佛有漏色, 唯大乘許他方佛色, 而取共許所餘色也. 若立前二, 便如次有一分自他所別不成, 因有隨一所依不成. 以此比量共比量故」.
集曰, 此解不然. 且依傳説, 汎因明法, 共比量中引自他法皆作不定. 若除小乘別許之色, 彼應將此作不定故.
(b) 「因云初三攝者, 十八界中初三攝也. 但言眼不攝, 耳等不定故. 言自許者, 避他有法差別相違. 謂定離眼識色, 非定離眼識色, 是有法差別. 立者許是不離眼色. 外作差別相違量云, “極成之色非是不離眼識之色, 初三所攝眼不攝故, 猶如眼識.” 爲遮此過故言自許. 謂引自許他方佛色, 與彼比量作不定過. 凡顯他過, 必自無過. 汝既不定, 我離相違.
然有新羅順憬法師, 於此量作決定相違, 乾封之歳寄請釋云, “眞故極成色定離於眼識, 自許初三攝眼識不攝故, 猶如眼根.” 時爲釋言, 凡因明法, 立法自他共敵對必須同. 前唯識量依共比量, 今依自敵, 即無不爾. 如佛弟子對聲生論立, “聲無常, 所作性故, 猶如瓶等.” 聲生論立聲量, “其常, 所聞性故, 如自許聲性.” 彼不成難. 此亦應然. 謂立言自許依共比量, 避他有法差別相違. 然彼敵量宗喩皆共, 唯因依自, 隨一不成. 大乘不許, “自許眼識不攝故”因, 於共色轉. 同喩亦有所立不成. 大乘之中, 根因識果非定即離故」.
集曰, 此難不然. 敵言「自許」, 豈成「眼識不攝故」因. 若彼還成眼識不攝, 而簡大乘攝相歸識, 還以宗法爲因之失. 然其眼識不攝故者. 倶取十八界別攝.
(c) 判比量云「敵言自許, 亦遮有法差別相違, 謂敵意許量定離眼識之色. 大乘師作相違量云, “極成之色應非定離眼識之色, 初三所攝眼識不攝故, 由如眼根.” 爲引自許佛有漏色作不定過, 故言自許」.
集曰, 諸釋自許皆失本意. 三藏量中自許, 若避他相違者, 虚設劬勞. 謂若小乘難極成色, 合成非色, 還害自宗, 不成相違, 必不違自, 理門説故. 若難彼色不離識義, 是正所諍, 非意許故. 若彼差別得成難者, 如立宗云「聲是無常, 所作性故, 猶如瓶等」. 於此亦應出如彼過. 謂是無常之聲非是無常之聲, 是有法差別. 立論意許是無常之聲, 外作有法差別過言「聲應非是無常之聲, 所作性故, 猶如瓶等」. 雖持所諍, 無常之義合成非聲, 既不成難. 雖持所諍, 不離識義合成非色, 豈獨成難. 故上古釋皆不可依.
(d) 然彼三藏立唯識意, 通對小乘及外道宗. 避外不立十八界者, 一分隨不成過故, 因言自許初三攝也. 因既自故自比量攝, 故他不得以不極成佛有漏色而作不定, 於自量無他不定故. 自義已成, 何遣他宗.
(e) 文軌師^☆24云「因明道理, 於共比量自法他法皆得不定, 以自在眼識所變眼根之影作不定過. 然判者云, 救即無過. 眞故極成色離極成眼識, 便無不定, 極成眼識不縁眼故. 以自許佛有漏色, 於前共量, 他作不定. 便改因云, “自許極成初三攝”等. 如無漏色耳識等縁, 雖離眼識而非極成初三攝, 故不成不定」. 然今如前自量爲好.
(f) 和上云「本量云, “不離眼識”者, 眼識・本識合名眼識. 立影不離眼識之時, 便成質亦不離本識. 如顯揚云, “阿頼耶識即六識”故. 不爾本量有不定過, 質亦自許初三所攝眼所不攝, 離眼識故」. 然無此過, 良由本意, 諸識爲一, 空諸境故. 如説藏識海轉浪起故. 由此外量喩有所立不成之失. 雖有諸家, 且存此釋云云^☆25

In this quotation, sentences enclosed by 「…」 are the quotations from Ji's Yinming-ruzhengli-lun-shu 因明入正理論疏 and Wŏnhyo's P'anbiryangnon. The sentences beginning with “集曰” can be attributed to T'aehyŏn or Tojŭng since Zenju quotes several parts beginning with “太賢師云”^☆26 or “太賢師抄, 道證集云”^☆27 instead. Moreover, part (g)(f)^☆補注1 should be attributed to Kyŏnghŭng because it nearly coincides with the quotation of Zenju that is quoted below:

興師解云: 竝取質影爲共許色. 本量云不離眼識者, 本識眼識合名眼識. 立影不離眼識之時, 便成質亦不離本識. 如顯揚云, “阿頼耶識即六識”故. 不爾本量有不定過. 質亦自許初三所攝眼所不攝, 離眼識故.^☆28

Thus, because of his honorific title “和上,” it may be reasonable to believe that T'aehyŏn respected Kyŏnghŭng.

In (a), (b), (c), and (e), T'aehyŏn quotes various critical interpretations of Xuanzang's inference and claims that “all critical interpretations miss the original purpose of Xuanzang's inference” (underlined part of (c)). We must focus on the fact that he criticizes Ji, who strongly supports Xuanzang's inference. In (a), he criticizes Ji for premising that the concepts of Xuanzang's inference were accepted both discussants and disputed only the predicate of the propositions (共比量). On the other hand, according to (d) and (f), he regards Xuanzang's inference as svārtha-anumāna in order to demonstrate the true purpose of Xuanzang's inference. Although T'aehyŏn also criticizes Ji's criticism of Sun'gyŏng in (b), we should not assume that T'aehyŏn agrees with Sun'gyŏng because he also criticizes Wŏnhyo in (c) in the same manner as he criticized Ji. In addition, in (f), T'aehyŏn quotes Kyŏnghŭng, who claims that visual consciousness in the Yogācāra inference should be interpreted as a combination of visual consciousness and ālaya vijñāna.

4. Conclusion

In conclusion, we can find at least two groups of Shilla Buddhists, one that was headed by Wŏnhyo and Sun'gyŏng (and probably Sinbang), and the other that was headed by Kyŏnghŭng, Tojŭng, and Daehyong. The former group intended to interpret and revise the Yogācāra inference following the system of Buddhist logic, especially by using Bhāvaviveka's method, since they believed that Xuanzang's logic was based on Bhāvaviveka's work. On the other hand, it appears that the latter group attempted to interpret the inference in the context of the general Yogācāra doctrines.

Nakamura examines the rationalism of the Korean people by quoting Wŏnhyo and Sun'gyŏng, but this approach alone is insufficient. In my opinion, the peculiarity that this indicated maybe one of the characteristics of Korean Buddhism, while the interpretations in China and Japan may be unified.

Acknowledgment

I am grateful to Professor Kim Sŏngch'ul of Dongguk University for providing valuable advice.

Footnotes

* Hanazono University

1. Xuanzang's biography in the Kōshōji 興聖寺 manuscript of the Xugaosengzhuan 續高僧傳, differs from the Taisho version. See Masumi Fujiyoshi. 道宣伝の研究 (A Study of the Life of Dau-Xuan). Kyoto University Press, 2002, and Makoto Yoshimura. “『大唐大慈恩寺三蔵法師伝』の成立について.” 仏教学 (Journal of Buddhist Studies), Vol. 37, 1995.
2. See, for example, T50, 452c.
3. See, for example, T50, 453a.
4. See, for example, T50, 453b.
5. Strictly speaking, the term inference is not an accurate translation of anumāna. Although the word inference may be suitable only when referring to parārtha-anumāna, the words proof or demonstration can be used when referring to svārtha-anumāna. In this paper, however, we would prefer to use the word inference since according to some studies Xuanzang and his followers did not distinguish between parārtha-anumāna and svārtha-anumāna.
6. “且如大師, 周遊西域, 學滿將還. 時戒日王, 王五印度, 爲設十八日無遮大會, 令大師立義遍諸天竺. 簡選賢良, 皆集會所, 遣外道小乘, 競申論詰. 大師立量, 時人無敢對揚者. 大師立唯識比量云: 眞故極成色不離於眼識宗, 自許初三攝眼所不攝故因, 猶如眼識喩” (T44, 115b). For readability, some inferences quoted in this paper are itemized.
7. Gang Xiao states that Xuanzang's Yogācāra inference was the core of Zhiejian-lun (“關于玄奘法師的眞唯識量 [On Xuanzang's inference to prove the truth of Yogācāra].” 戒幢佛學, Vol. 2. 2002.).
8. Yasunori Ejima. 中観思想の展開: Bhāvaviveka研究 (Development of Mādhyamika Philosophy in India: Studies on Bhāvaviveka), Shunjūsha, 1980, p. 205.
9. Hajime Nakamura. “韓国人の思惟方法 (The Korean Way of Thinking),” チベット人・韓国人の思惟方法, Shunjūsha, 1989.
10. This chapter is based on my paper: Shigeki Moro. “清辨比量の東アジアにおける受容,” 불교학연구 (佛教學研究; Journal of Buddhist Studies), Vol. 8.
11. “雅量弘遠, 至徳深邃” (T51, 930c)
12. “眞性有爲空, 如幻緣生故. 無爲無有實, 不起似空華” (T30, 268b).
13. Shun'ei Hirai. 中国般若思想史研究: 吉蔵と三論学派, Shunjūsha, 1976, p. 237.
14. Shōshin Fukihara. 日本唯識思想史, Taigadō, 1944 (republished by Kokusho Kankō kai, 1989), p. 125.
15. See Sosho's 宗性 Miroku nyorai kan'no sho 彌勒如來感應抄, Vol. 5 (Jokai Hiraoka. Nihon miroku jodo shisou tenkai shi no kenkyu, 1977, p. 534).
16. “新羅元曉法師判比量論云「掌珍比量同廣百量」等云云. 道證師解此判非理, 量意別故. (…) 雖彼二論皆破所執, 而所對異. 廣百唯破小乘外道, 掌珍通對大小及外. 昉法師説, 珍百二論所對無異. 量意同故. (…) 興法師説云, 二論量別. (…) 掌珍云空, 廣百非實, 義極異故. (…) 廣如貶量第十卷” (T71, 449c).
17. “且有二宗. 一清辨等述般若, 言有爲無爲俗有眞空, 如掌珍頌 (…). 二護法等依解深密, 言一切法有空不空, 如中邊頌 (…). 有説此二實有諍論, 如佛地論: 千年已後, 大乘之中空有諍論. (…) 測等傳説實有諍論. 有説二師都無諍論. (…) 順憬師等傳無諍論. 有説此二語諍意同. (…) 元曉師等, 語諍意同” (HBC3, 483b–484a).
18. Moreover, Kyŏndŭng's 見登 Taesŭng kishillon tong'i yakjip 大乘起信論同異略集 evaluates the inference of Dasheng zhangzhen lun in a positive manner and compares it with Lengyan jing 楞嚴經 (HBC3, 691-692). However, this topic is beyond the scope of our discussion, since, according to Ch'oe Yŏn-shik, Kyŏndŭng's work was relevant in the Japanese context.“『大乘起信論同異略集』の著者について,” Journal of Buddhism (edited by Komazawa Junior College), Vol. 7, 2001.
19. For more details on P'anbiryangnon, see Kim Sŏngch'ol's Wŏnhyo ŭi P'anbiryangnon kich'o yŏn'gu, chisik sanŏpsa, 2003.
20. “若對五根實互用宗, 則應立言: 眞故極成色離極成眼識, 自許初三攝眼識不攝故, 猶如眼根. 若作是難, 可離不定” (T68, 317a).
21. “然有新羅順憬法師者, 聲振唐蕃學苞大小, 業崇迦葉, 毎稟行於杜多, 心務薄倶, 恒馳誡於小欲, 既而蘊藝西夏, 傳照東夷, 名道日新, 緇素欽挹, 雖彼龍象不少, 海外時稱獨歩. 於此比量作決定相違, 乾封之歳, 寄請師釋云: 真故極成色定離於眼識, 自許初三攝眼識不攝故, 猶如眼根” (T44, 116a).
22. “今此決定相違者, 本是新羅元曉大徳之所製也. 後順憬師, 得此比量, 不能通釋, 乾封年中, 遣於大唐, 令決其疑所以得知. 定賓律師理門疏云: 新羅順憬師, 乾封年中, 傳彼本國元曉師作相違決定, 來至此國云, ‘眞故極成色, 定離於眼識, 因喩同此.' 三藏于時躊躇未釋云云” (T68, 321a).
23. “玄奘三藏於西域中, 欲學瑜伽論. 時西域中在戒賢論師, 欲涅槃時, 天唱如是言: 漢國之賢人爲學瑜伽論故來, 莫爲涅槃. 爾時玄奘順付, 往學瑜伽論, 然後立眞故極成量, 而破小乘執, 時西域諸論師等無釋此量. 此諸論師皆言: 不陳那不能是量釋. 時玄奘還於漢國而爲説是量, 時無斥是量過, 爾時造廣百論疏, 文軌師誓願言: 不陳那菩薩無是量釋, 若有是量過人, 我爲其作臣也. 爾時順師學是已, 還於羅國申是量. 時元曉菩薩云: 此量有法差別相違過. 爾順師如其自知通於唐國言, 水土是易故, 至於羅國知是量過. 時論師等皆向東三禮尊重讃嘆. 故道證師等章疏中, 羅國元曉師等章疏中, 羅國師所説, 由是義故知, 陳那菩薩云云” (T68, 525b-c). Kim Sang-hyŏn's Wŏnhyo Yŏn'gu 元曉研究 (Minjoksa, 2000) indicates the same example found in Saisen's 済暹 Shaku-makaen-ron-ketsugi-hanan-eshaku-shō 釋摩訶衍論決疑破難會釋抄.
24. Based on two reasons, Kosei Ishii supposes that Mun'gwe/Wengui 文軌, an unidentified scholar monk who wrote some commentaries on Buddhist logic, came from Shilla: (1) Similar to Wŏnch'ŭk, Mun'gwe was severely criticized by Ji. (2) Mun'gwe belonged to the Ximingsi 西明寺 temple, where many foreign monks, especially Shilla monks like Wŏnch'ŭk, stayed (Kosei Ishii. “朝鮮仏教における三論教学,” Sanron kyōgaku no kenkyū 三論教学の研究, Shunjūsha, 1990. See also 李泰昇. “文軌ŭi因明観攷,” 韓國佛敎學, 25, 1999).
25. T68, 520b–521a.
26. T66, 316a.
27. T66, 318a.
28. T66, 316a.

補注

以下の補注は論文が出た後のもの。

1. (g)は(f)の誤り。